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Abstract. Logistical management has been advanced rapidly in these
years, taking advantage of the broad connectivity of the Internet. As it
becomes an important part of our lives, it also raises many challeng-
ing issues, e.g., the counterfeits of expensive goods pose a serious threat
to supply chain management. As a result, path authentication becomes
especially important in supply chain management, as it helps us main-
tain object pedigree and supply chain integrity. Meanwhile, a tag path
authentication must meet a series of security requirements, such as au-
thentication, privacy, and unlinkability. In addition, the authentication
protocol must be ecient.
In 2011, the rst tag path authentication protocol in an RFID-based
supply chain, named \Tracke", is proposed by Blass et al. in NDSS'11.
They have made an important breakthrough in this research area. In
this paper, we improve their work and propose a more ecient tag path
authentication protocol in an RFID-based supply chain, which meets all
the above mentioned security requirements. Our result shows that the
proposed protocol can signicantly reduce both computational overhead
and memory requirement on tags, compared with the previous work.
Keywords: RFID, Tag path authentication, Security and privacy,Unlinkability.
1 Introduction
With the help of radio-frequency identication (RFID) system, object iden-
tication and tracking can be easily achieved in a supply chain. An object's
identication is stored in a tag which is embedded in an object. The tag can be
interrogated by a tag reader via a wireless communication channel in an RFID-
based system. As a result, the location of an object and its shipping path can be
tracked. The system with tracking capability has been widely adopted in supply
chain management. Both participants and beneciaries of a supply chain concern
the genesis of an object,and whether an object is being cloned in conveyance in a
supply chain. In todays RFID applications, one of the most challenging problems
is tag security and privacy. Considering the limited memory of a tag and its lack
of computing capability, to develop an ecient path authentication protocol has
always been regarded as a challenging topic.
Currently,logistic management is mainly represented by RFID-based supply
chain management, and it is widely adopted and becomes an important part of
our daily lives. RFID technology brings convenience to logistic network, and it
has been widely used in numerous applications,including manufacturing, logistic-
s, transportation, warehouse inventory control, supermarket checkout counters,
etc. [8]. As forecasted,the overall RFID market will pass 6 billion in 2011 [1].
It not only covers traditional applications such as access control, automobile
immobilization, and electronic toll collection, but also includes emerging appli-
cations such as animal ID, asset management, baggage handling, cargo track-
ing/security, contactless payment and ticketing,real-time locating systems,and
supply chain management. In a supply chain,participants mainly concern the
issues of anti-counterfeiting,anti-cloning,and replica-prevention of luxury prod-
ucts or pharmaceutics [21,15,4], healthcare [11], mobile device [10]. However, we
cannot eectively track or monitor object movements in a supply chain, since an
adversary can inject fake objects into the supply chain,which eventually hurts
sellers and purchasers. In the supply chain management, path authentication is
especially important for guaranteeing object genuineness by maintaining object
pedigree and supply chain integrity.
Security and privacy are the two important issues for RFID-based supply
chain systems [19,22,17,14,18,3,8,4,5]. For security property, a path authenti-
cation protocol must be able to verify if an object has taken one of the valid
paths through supply chain. For privacy property, a path authentication solution
should prevent adversaries from identifying, tracing, or linking tags in a supply
chain. Because RFID tags are usually passive entities which have limited memo-
ry and almost no computation capability, it is thus very challenging to design a
protocol which is ecient and is able to meet security and privacy requirements.
Moreover,RFID-based supply chain has been a very active research area in recent
years, and has attracted a lot of attention in the past years in both industry and
academic, partially due to its broad deployment for automated oversight of sup-
ply chain by many large organizations, such as WalMart, Procter and Gamble,
and the United States Department of Defense [16,13].
1.1 Related Work
There are already many path authentication protocols in network literature,
including protocols for routing, protocols in wireless sensor network, and secure
border gateway protocols [12,6,7,23,20]. However,these protocols are mostly im-
plemented among computers or sensors with considerable computation capabil-
ities. The minimum requirement of these protocols is participants with some
computation capabilities. Thus,they are not suitable for path authentication in
an RFID-based supply chain, where we assume that tags have no computation
capability at all.
The rst real solution for tag path authentication in an RFID-based supply
chain was proposed by Blass et.al. [4] in NDSS'11, named \Tracker". The security
and privacy of their protocol are based on an extension of polynomial signature
techniques for run-time fault detection using homomorphic encryption. In their
protocol, an issuer is responsible for the setup of system parameters, including
public parameters for the system, and public/private key pairs for all the readers
and a manager. Each party keeps his own private key secretly. Since only the
manager can verify a path and validate the path, the manager is equipped with
all readerss private keys and his own private key. Meanwhile, the manager owns
a valid path set which includes all possible valid paths that a tag may take.
Tracker is implemented in an elliptic curve with no requirement on tag computing
capability. As claimed by the authors, their solution [4] is the rst one available
solely based on cheap, non tamper-proof RFID tags.
1.2 Our Contribution
After an extensive study of the previous protocol [4],we are able to further
improve their work with more ecient use of computing power and memory.
Our improvement is twofold: one is on space memory of tags, and the other is on
computational cost. Similar to [4], we use elliptic curve ElGamal-based public
key encrypting [9] as the main technique to construct our protocol. However,we
reduce the memory size from 6 group elements to 5 group elements, thus the
memory space is reduced from 960 bits of the previous work [4] to 800 bits.
This is due to the use of a dierent method to verify the tags path,i.e., we use
another randomly re-encrypted element in the group to encrypt a tag and its
valid path instead of one group element and HMAC signature [2]. With respect
to the computational cost, we do not use HMAC signature in the construction
of our protocol. Though the HMAC [2] operation is only a hash function, and it
does not need much more computational cost, our protocol is better than the
previous one [4] both in multiplication and exponentiation operations. Of the
importance, our work is compatible with EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags.
1.3 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the preliminary knowledge, including components, assumptions, denitions, and
security models. We then describe our ecient tag path authentication protocol
in Section 3, followed by security analysis in Section 4. We compare our work with
the previous one in computational cost and memory use in Section 5. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 6
2 Preliminary and Denitions
2.1 Components
There are four entities in our tag path authentication protocol.
Tag Ti: Tags are radio transponders attached to physical objects. A tag has an
initial state which is written into it by an issuer, and the state is updated
each time when the tag interacts with a reader. The update action represents
that the tag proceeds in a supply chain.
Reader Ri: Each reader interacts with numerous tags. It reads out the cur-
rent state of a tag, and then computes a new state (re-encrypts the current
state) for the tag. At last, the new state information is written to the tag.
Each reader has its back-end database for computations and storage of some
information.
Issuer I: There is only one issuer in the system. The issuer is responsible for the
generation of system's public parameters and the public/private key pairs
for all the readers and the manager. For a new tag T which is ready to enter
a supply chain, the issuer I writes an initial state s0T to T .
Manager M : There is only one manager in the system, which is equipped
with all the private keys of readers besides his own one. The manager is the
only role who can verify the validation of a path. To verify the validation
of a path, he must have a set Pvalid full of all valid paths, such as Pvalidi
beforehand.
Similar to [4], our tag path authentication protocol includes four stages: (1) the
system initialization stage; (2) the tag preparation stage; (3) the tag and reader
interaction stage; and (4) the path verication stage.
2.2 Path Authentication Protocol in An RFID-Based Supply Chain
A path authentication protocol in an RFID-based supply chain typically
consists of the following ve algorithms:
Setup: It is run by the issuer. The algorithm outputs the system's parameters
par, including an elliptic curve E over a nite eld Fp. E is with a large prime
order q such that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable for G = hgi,
where g is a generator on E(Fp). Here, p and q are security parameters with
jpj = jqj =160 bit.
KeyGen: It is run by the issuer. The algorithm generates the private keys for
all the readers in the system, as well as the private key of the manager.
Enc: It is run by the issuer. When a tag T is ready to enter the supply chain,
the issuer computes the initial state s0T of tag on T 's identication IDT using
this algorithm. Finally, the issuer writes s0T to the tag T .
ReEnc: It is run by the reader. When a tag T interacts with a reader, the reader
reads out the current state siT of T , and re-encrypts s
i
T into a new state s
i+1
T
of T , where i represents the step the tag T proceeds in the supply chain.
Finally, the reader writes si+1T to the tag T .
Dec: It is run by the manager. When a tag T with the nal state skT arrives at the
end point of a supply chain, the manager checks whether T has gone through
a valid path specied by the issuer using this algorithm. The algorithm gets
the identication of T as well as its path by decrypting skT .
In our protocol, we use the same assumptions as in [4]. These assumptions
are summarized as follows:
 A supply chain is represented by a directed diagraph G = (V;E), where V is
a set of vertices, and E is a set of edges. Each vertex v 2 V is equivalent to
one step in the supply chain, and is uniquely associated with a reader Ri
1.
Each directed edge e 2 E, e :=   !vivj , is a representation from vertex vi to
vertex vj , where vj is a possible next step from step vi in the supply chain.
 A valid path Pvalidi is a special path which the manager M will eventually
check objects for. M owns a set of Pvalid which includes all the valid paths
in a supply chain.
 A reader Ri is honest-but-curious, i.e., a reader Ri at step vi behaves correctly
when it interacts with a tag which is going through it, but it will collect in-
formation from the interaction and might derive something non-trivial from
those information.
2.3 Security Statements and Adversary Models
We formalize the security model using the game-based methodology. The
game is played between a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A and
a challenger C.
First, we describe several oracles which any PPT adversary could query dur-
ing the interaction between an adversary and a challenger in the game-based
security model.
 Onextsp(siTi): On the query of a tag Ti's next step according to the state siTi ,
the challenger nds the next step reader Rj for A according to the current
state of Ti. While Rj transforms the tag Ti from its current state to a new
state.
 Ord(IDTi): On input of a tag Ti's identity IDTi by the adversary A, this oracle
returns the current state of Ti to A.
 Oenc(IDTi): On input of a tag Ti's identity IDTi by an adversary A, the chal-
lenger responds to A the initial state of tag Ti by running Enc(IDTi).
 Oreenc(sjTi): On input a state of the tag Ti, the challenger responds to A Ti's
new state of next step sj+1Ti by running ReEnc(s
j
Ti
).
 Ocp(Ti): On the query of the path that a tag Ti went through, the challenger
returns 1 to the adversary A if tag Ti went through a valid path; Otherwise,
the challenger returns 0 to A. However, the challenger does not return the
real path to A.
 OT;P(Pvalidi): On input a specied valid path Pvalidi by the adversary A, the
challenger randomly selects a tag from the path Pvalidi , and returns it to A.
 OT;v(v0): On input a specied step v0, the challenger randomly picks a tag
which has gone through step v0, and returns it to A.
We consider three common security requirements for RFID applications in a
supply chain: authentication, tag privacy, and (tag and path) unlinkability [4].
1 Since the tag's step in a supply chain is represented by a reader in our protocol, in
this paper, we use \step" and \reader" interchangeably.
Authentication
Denition 1 (Authentication). Authentication implies that any PPT adver-
sary cannot forge a tag's internal state with a valid path that was not actually
taken by the tag in the supply chain.
We formalize this property using the following game between a PPT adversary
A and a challenger C.
Denition 2 (Authentication Game). A PPT adversary A is given the sys-
tem's public parameters and the public keys of all readers and manager before
he interacts with the challenger C in the following game.
First, the adversary selects a target step v, v is associated with some reader,
say Rj.
Phase 1: The adversary A makes the following queries:
 Oenc(IDTi): For the initial state query for some tag Ti, the challenger
chooses a valid path Pvalidi for A, and returns s0Ti  Enc(IDTi) to A.
The challenger records the path Pvalidi and the corresponding Ti in a ta-
ble, i.e., Tvalid.
 Oreenc(sjTi): A makes request to C for a new state of tag Ti, the challenger
searches Tvalid for the path of Ti and nds out the next reader of Ti, i.e.,
Rj. Then, the challenger updates the state s
j
Ti
to a new state sj+1Ti by
running ReEnc(sjTi), and returns the new state s
j+1
Ti
to A.
 Ord(IDTi): The challenger reads out the current state of tag Ti and returns
it to A.
 Onextsp(siTi): On input of a state of some tag Ti, the challenger searches
Tvalid for the path of Ti and nds out the next reader of Ti, i.e., Rj.
Finally, the challenger returns Rj to A.
 Ocp(Ti): on input of a tag Ti, the challenger returns 1 to the adversary A
if the tag Ti went through a valid path; Otherwise, the challenger returns
0 to A. However, the challenger does not return the real path to A.
Challenge: A selects a tag Tc, and outputs a forged state of tag Tc at step r
as srTc .
Decision: The challenger computes (IDTc ; Pvalidk) Dec(srTc). If tag Tc did not
go through the step v and v 2 Pvalidk , the challenger outputs 1; Otherwise,
he outputs 0.
Denition 3. Let adv denote the advantage that A outputs a valid tag state
srTc in the above security game, and C outputs 1 in the Decision stage. We
say a path authentication solution is authenticated if for all PPT adversary A,
Pr[adv]  " holds, where " is negligible.
Tag Privacy
Denition 4 (Privacy). We say that a path authentication solution keeps the
privacy property, if for any PPT adversary A, he cannot tell whether a tag Ti
went through some step, say, reader R, in the supply chain only based on the
data stored on the tag [4].
We formally dene the security model for tag privacy in the following game.
Denition 5 (Privacy Game). A PPT adversary A is given the system's pub-
lic parameters and the public keys of all readers and manager before he interacts
with the challenger C in the following game.
Choose: The adversary A chooses a reader R (step) as his target.
Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary A makes the following queries to the
challenger C:
 For any queries with the form of Oenc(IDTi), Oreenc(sjTi), Ord(IDTi), Onextsp(s
j
Ti
),
and Ocp(Ti), the challenger C responds to A in the same way as in the
\Authentication Game"
 OT;v(v0): On input of a specied step v0, the challenger picks a tag which
went through step v0 randomly, and returns it to A.
Challenge: C chooses a random bit b from f0; 1g. If b = 0, C selects a tag Tc
which did not go through R. Otherwise, C selects a tag Tc which went through
R. Then, C reads out the current state of Tc, i.e., sjTc , and sends to A an
updated state sj+1Tc computed using ReEnc(s
j
Tc
).
Phase 2: A continues to make the above queries to C adaptively as in Phase
1, with the restriction that A cannot make a query on OT;v(R).
Decision: Finally, A outputs a guess b0 = 1 if he regards Tc went through R.
Otherwise, he outputs 0.
Denition 6. Let adv denote the event that A outputs a right guess in the above
game. We say that a path authentication solution is privacy preserving, if for any
PPT adversary A, Pr[adv]  " holds, where " is negligible.
Unlinkability. In accordance with [4], unlinkability is divided into tag unlink-
ability and path unlinkability.
Tag unlinkability means that given some states of two arbitrary tags T0 and
T1 in a supply chain, no PPT adversary can distinguish T0 from T1 with non-
negligible advantage.
We dene the security game for tag unlinkability as follows:
Denition 7 (Tag Unlinkability Game). The PPT adversary A is given the
system's public parameters and the public keys of all readers and manager before
he interacts with the challenger C in the following game.
Choose: The adversary A chooses two random tags T0 and T12.
Phase 1: The adversary A makes the following queries:
 For any queries with the form of Oenc(IDTi), Oreenc(sjTi), Ord(IDTi), Onextsp(s
j
Ti
),
and Ocp(Ti), the challenger C responds to A in the same way as in the
\Authentication Game"
 OT;P(Pvalidj ): On input of a specied valid path Pvalidj by the adversary
A, which both T0 and T1 did not go through, the challenger picks a tag
from the path Pvalidj randomly, and returns it to A.
2 We suppose that both T0 and T1 must be in a valid path in the following simulation.
Challenge: First, C chooses a random bit b from f0; 1g. Second, C reads out
the current state of Tb, i.e., s
i
Tb
. Finally, C updates state siTb to a new state
si+1Tb by running Oreenc(siTb), and returns si+1Tb to A.
Phase 2: A continues to make queries as in Phase 1.
Decision: A outputs his guess b0. If b0 = b, A is said to be successful in the
game; Otherwise, A fails in the game.
Denition 8 (Tag Unlinkability). Let adv dene the event that A outputs a
right guess in the decision phase in the above tag unlinkability game. We say
that a path authentication solution is tag unlinkable, if for any PPT adversary
A, Pr[adv]  12 + " holds, where " is negligible.
Path unlinkability. Path unlinkability means that given two tags Ti and Tj , no
PPT adversary A can tell whether these two tags went through the same path
with probability at least 12 + ".
Next, we dene the security game for path unlinkability.
Denition 9 (Path Unlinkability Game). The PPT adversary A is given
the system's public parameters and the public keys of all readers and manager
before he interacts with the challenger C in the following game.
Choose: A chooses a random tag T , C then gives the path Pvalidt that T went
through to A.
Phase 1: The adversary A makes the following queries:
 OT;P(Pvalidj ): On input of a specied valid path Pvalidj by the adversary
A, the challenger picks a tag from the path Pvalidj randomly, and returns
it to A.
 For any queries with the form of Oenc(IDTi), Oreenc(sjTi), Ord(IDTi), Onextsp(s
j
Ti
),
and Ocp(Ti), the challenger C responds to A in the same as in the \Au-
thentication Game"
Challenge: First, C chooses a random bit b from f0; 1g. If b = 0, C randomly
chooses a tag Tc which does not go through Pvalidt ; Otherwise, if b = 1, C
randomly chooses a tag Tc which goes through Pvalidt . Second, C reads out
the current state of Tc, i.e., s
i
Tc
. Finally, C updates state siTc into a new state
si+1Tc by running Oreenc(siTc), and sends si+1Tc to A as the target.
Phase 2: A continues to make queries as in Phase 1 with the restriction that
A cannot make a query on OT;P(Pvalidt).
Decision: A outputs his guess b0 which indicates whether Tc goes through
Pvalidt , where b
0 = 1 means that A guesses Tc goes through Pvalidt , andb0 = 0
means that A guesses Tc does not go through path Pvalidt .
Denition 10 (Path Unlinkability). Suppose that adv denes the event that
A outputs a right guess in the decision phase in the above path unlinkability
game. We say that a path authentication solution is path unlinkable, if for any
PPT adversary A, Pr[adv]  12 + " holds, where " is negligible.
3 The Proposed Tag Path Authentication Protocol
In this section, we rst recall the Tracker protocol [DBLP:conf/ndss/BlassEM11,21]
in Section 3.1. Second, we propose our track and trace protocol for RFID-based
supply chain in Section 3.2. Finally, we give a concise comparison on these two
protocols to show that our protocol is more ecient in computational cost and
tag's memory space overhead.
3.1 Description of Tracker Protocol
Typically, a tracker protocol consists of the four phases: (1) an initial setup
phase; (2)new tags' preparation for entering the supply chain; (3) the interaction
between a tag and a reader in the supply chain; and (4) the manager's verication
on a path. These four phases are described as follows [4]:
Initialization This phase is done by the issuer I:
1. Select a homomorphic mappingM : Fq ! E to map a mark (P) to a point
in the elliptic curve such that 8m1;m2 2 Fq;M(m1 +m2) = M(m1) +
M(m2), and a mapping of mark (P) 2 Fq to a point as M((P)) =
(P)  P 2 E .
2. Set up an elliptic curve ElGamal cryptosystem ?? and generate the secret
key sk and public key pk = (P; Y = sk  P ), such that the order of P is a
large prime q, jqj = 160 bit.
3. Select x0, a generator of the nite eld Fq, and a0  R Fq.
4. Generate a random bit string k0, jk0j = 160 bit. The initial step v0, repre-
senting the issuer in the supply chain, is associated with (a0; k0).
5. Generate  random numbers ai 2 Fq; 1  i  , and  random bit string
ki, jkij = 160 bit. I sends to each reader Ri, representing step vi, the tuple
(i; ai; ki) using a secure channel.
6. I providesM with secret key sk, generator x0, and tuple (i; ai; ki). Therewith,
M is equipped with all the keys and informed which reader Ri at step vi
knows which (ai; ki)
7. The manager M knows all the valid paths in a set Svalid, he computes all the
jSvalidj valid path marks (Pvalid).
8. Finally, M computes and stores pairs(M((Pvalid), steps), where steps is
the sequence of steps              !v0vPvalid;1 : : : vPvalid;` of Pvalidi . That is, M knows for each
mapping the sequence of steps.
Preparation
 Draw a random identication ID 2 Fq and two random numbers r; rID 2 Fq.
 Compute
c0ID = E(ID) = (UID; VID) = (rID  P;M(ID) + rID  Y )
c0 = E((v0)) = (U
0
; V
0
 ) = (r  P; a0 _P + r  Y )
 Let HMAC be a secure HMAC algorithm, HMACk(m) : Fq  Fq ! Fq. I
computes signature 0(v0; ID) := HMACk0(ID).
 Finally, the issuer I writes state s0T = (c0ID); c0; 0) into T . Now, T is ready
to enter the supply chain.
Interaction
 Assume that a tag T arrives at step vi and reader Ri in the supply chain
P =         !v0v1 : : : vi 1. Ri reads out T 's current state si 1T = (ci 1ID ); ci 1 ; i 1).
 Given the ciphertext ci 1 = (U i 1 ; V i 1 ); x0 and ai, Ri computes ci =
(U i; V
i
), wehre
U i = x0  U i 1 = (x0ri 1 )  P
V i = x0 _V
i 1
 + ai  P
= (a0x
i
0 +
iX
j=1
ajx
i j
0 )  P + (x0ri j )  Y
 Using i 1(ID), Ri computes i(ID) = HMACki(i 1(ID)).
 Ri re-encryps ci 1ID ); ci. It picks randomly two numbers r0ID and r0 2 Fq, and
outputs two new ciphertext as:
ciID = (U
i
ID; V
i
ID) = (r
0
ID  P + U i 1ID ; r0ID  Y + V i 1ID )
c
0i
 = (U
0i
 ; V
0i
 ) = (r
0
  P + U i; r0  Y + V i)
Veriication
 M reads out tag T 's state s`T = (c`ID; c`; `(ID)).
 M decrypts c`ID to get the plaintext ID = Dsk(c`ID) 2 Fq.
 M checks for cloning, by looking up ID in M 's database DBclone. If ID 2
DBclone, then M outputs ? and rejects T .
 Otherwise,M decrypts c` and gets  = Dsk(c`) = (P) P . Then,M matches
the result with his list of valid mapping M((Pvalidi)). If there is no match
existed, M outputs ? and rejects T .
 M checks the signature: check if the following equation holds using the secret
keys (k0; k1; : : : ; k`),
`(ID) = HMACk`(HMACk` 1(: : : (HMACk0(ID)))):
 If the above equation holds, M outputs Pvalid, add ID to DBclone. Otherwise,
M outputs ? and rejects T .
3.2 Our Protocol
In this part, we propose an ecient tag track and trace protocol for RFID-
based supply chains. Our protocol shares the assumptions of the rst tag track
and trace protocol [ [4],21]. Compared with [4], our protocol is better both in
computation and memory cost. Our protocol consists of the following ve algo-
rithms:
Setup: It outputs the system's public parameters par, including an elliptic curve
E over a nite eld Fp. E(Fp) is of a large prime order q such that the discrete
logarithm problem is intractable for G = hgi, wehre g is a generator on E(Fp).
Here, p and q are security parameters with jpj = jqj = 160 bit. Meanwhile, a
cryptographic collision-resistent hash function H : f0; 1g ! G is output by
this algorithm.
KeyGen: It generates the public/private key pairs for all the readers in the
system as well as the manager. For a reader Ri, it picks a random element xi
from Fq, and sets ski = xi, pki = gxi . For the only manager in the system, the
algorithm selects two random xm1 ; xm2 from Fq, and sets skm = (xm1 ; xm2),
pkm = (pkm1 ; pkm2) =(g
xm1 ; gxm2 ).
The above two algorithms are run by the issuer during the system initializa-
tion stage.
Enc: When a tag T is ready to enter a supply chain, the issuer I computes the
initial state s0T of T on T 's identication IDT using this algorithm.
 Select a valid path Pvalidi for tag T , and a random number r 2 Fq.
 Compute s0T = (s01T ; s02T ; s03T ; s04T ), where s01T = gr, s02T = pkrm1  IDT ,
s03T = pk
r
m2  H(IDT ; Pvalidi), ,s04T = (pk1 : : : pk`)r. Here, pk1 : : : pk` are
the respective public keys of all the readers in the system.
 Finally, the issuer I writes state s0T into the tag T with the identication
is IDT . Now, the tag T is qualied to enter the supply chain.
This algorithm is run by the issuer during the tag preparation stage.
ReEnc: When a tag T interacts with a reader, the reader reads out the current
state siT of T , then, re-encrypts T 's state s
i
T into a new state s
i+1
T . The
re-encryption algorithm is described as follows:
 Aessume that a tag T arrives at step vi+1 and reader Ri+1 with public
key pki+1 reads out T 's current state s
i
T for some i; 1  i  `.
 Given the state information siT , we divide it into the following two cases:
1. For i = 0, which means the tag is read by the rst reader in the
supply chain. In this case, we parse s0T into (s
0
1T ; s
0
2T ; s
0
3T ; s
0
4T ). Then,
Ri+1 selects a random number ri+1 2 Fq, and computes si+1T =
(si+11;1T ; s
i+1
1;2T
; si+12T ; s
i+1
3T
; si+14T ), where
si+11;1T = s
0
1T  gr1 = gr+r1
si+11;2T = (s
0
1T )
r1 = grr1
si+12T = s
0
2T  pkr1m1 = pkr+r1m1  IDT
si+13T = s
0
3T  pkr1m2 = pkr+r1m2  H(IDT ; Pvalidi)
si+14T =
s04T
(s01T )
ski+1
= (pk1 : : : pki  pki+2 : : : pk`)rr1
2. For i  1, we parse siT into (si1;1T ; si1;2T ; si2T ; si3T ; si4T ). Then, Ri+1
selects a random number ri+1 2 Fq, and computes si+1T = (si+11;1T ;
si+11;2T ; s
i+1
2T
; si+13T ; s
i+1
4T
), where
si+11;1T = s
i
1T  gri+1 = gr+r1+:::+ri+1
si+11;2T = (s
i
1T )
ri+1 = grr1:::ri+1
si+12T = s
i
2T  pkri+1m1 = pkr+r1+:::+ri+1m1  IDT
si+13T = s
i
3T  pkri+1m2 = pkr+r1+:::+ri+1m2  H(IDT ; Pvalidi)
si+14T =
si4T
(si1;2T )
ski+1
= (pki+2 : : : pk`)
rr1:::ri+13
This algorithm is run by the respecting reader when the tag and reader
interacts during the interaction stage.
Dec: When a tag T with the nal state skT arrives at the manager, the manager
checks whether T has gone through a valid path specied by the issuer using
this algorithm. The algorithm gets the identication of T as well as its path
by decrypting skT .
 M reads out T 's state (skT = sk1;1T ; sk1;2T ; sk2T ; sk3T ; sk4T ).
 M decrypts sk2T to get the plaintext IDT =
sk2T
(sk1;1T
)skm1
.
 For a possible valid path, suppose that pki: : : : ; pkj are public keys of those
readers who are not in that valid path. M checks whether the following
equation holds or not:
sk4T
?
= (sk1;2T )
xi+:::xj
The manager can nd out all the readers who took part in the interaction
with the tag T .
 The manager further veries the path by testing whether H(IDT ; Pvalidi) =
sk3T =(s
k
1;1T )
skm2 , where k represents the last step that the tag T has gone
through.
This algorithm is run by the unique manager during the path verication
stage.
3 For simplicity, we use Ri (whose public key is pki) to represents the corresponding
step i in the supply chain in our protocol, where 1  i  `.
3.3 Comparison
From the above description of the two track and trace protocols for RFID-
based supply chains, we can nd that in our newly proposed protocol, we encrypt
a tag and its path as a whole message under the manager's public key. Each time
a reader interacts with a tag, it erases itself from one element of the ciphertext,
and randomly re-encrypts all the elements of the ciphertexts. While, Tracker
[4],21] uses an HMAC signature to further verify the tag and its path. There is
no need to use an HMAC signature to further verify the tag and its valid path
in our protocol, since the manager could verify the tag and path by decrypting
the state of the tag. Such improvement reduces the memory space of tags from
960 bits to 800 bits, since an HMAC signature needs 160 bits.
4 Security Analysis on The Proposed Protocol
We give a security analysis on security, privacy, and unlinkability, respectively
in this section. For all the following security proof, we use the same system's
parameters.
4.1 Authentication
Theorem 1. Any forged state of tag Ti output by a PPT adversary A, which A
has claimed that the tag Ti has gone through some step but in fact the tag does
not go through it in a supply chain, can be detected by the challenger.
Proof. Given any PPT adversary A attacking our tag path authentication proto-
col on the security property of authentication, the challenger can always detect
whether the tag with that state went through the target step, say v.
C runs Setup to generate the system's public parameters, such as an elliptic
curve E over a nite eld Fp, a large prime order q of E such that the discrete
logarithm problem is intractable for G = hgi, where g is a generator on E(Fp),
and p and q are security parameters with jpj = jqj = 160 bit. Meanwhile, a
cryptographic collision-resistent hash function H : f0; 1g ! G is output by C. C
also generates the public/private key pairs for all the readers and the manager
in the system. Finally, C gives these public parameters and public keys to A.
Next, we describe how A and C interact during the security game.
First, the adversary A chooses a random step v as his target, v is associated
with some reader Rj .
Phase 1:In this phase, A can adaptively make queries including Oenc(IDTi),
Oreenc(sjTi),Ord(IDTi),Onextsp(s
j
Ti
), andOcp(Ti), C responds toA as described
in the authentication security game.
Challenge: In this phase, A outputs a forged state of arbitrary tag Tc. We
denote the state by srTc = (s
r
1;1Tc
; sr1;2Tc ; s
r
2Tc
; sr3Tc ; s
r
4Tc
).
Decision: In this phase, the challenger computes IDTc and H(IDTc ; Pvalidi) by
running Dec(srTc). If Pvalidi contains v
 (i.e., Rj), but Rj 's public key pkj
remained in sr4Tc , then, C outputs 1 (it means that tag Tc has not gone
through the step v, but v 2 Pvalidi .) Otherwise, C outputs 0.
Analysis. Suppose that the adversary claims that the forged state of tag Tc did
not go through the step v, but in fact v appears in Pvalidi , the challenger can
detect it easily. Since if the tag Tc did not go through the step v
, without loss
of generality, we use reader Rj , whose public key is pkj to represent the step
v, then pkj must appear in si4Tc . If C has judged that pkj appears in sr4Tc , thenC can easily draw the conclusion that the state is not a valid state of tag Tc if
Pvalidi contains Rj , where Pvalidi can be computed by the challenger using the
manager's private key.
This indicates that the adversary cannot forge a valid state of any tag that
he claimed having gone through a valid path, but in fact the tag did not go
through it.
4.2 Privacy
Theorem 2. If there exists a PPT adversary A that could tell whether a tag
went through some step v in the supply chain with non-negligible advantage ",
then, there exists another PPT algorithm B that can solve the discrete logarithm
problem with the same advantage.
Proof. In the beginning of the game, C generates the system's public parameters
and public/private key pairs for all the readers and the manager as those in
security proof for authentication. We omit it here for brevity. Finally, C gives
these public parameters and public keys to the adversary A.
Choose: The adversary A chooses a reader R as his target step.
Phase 1:In this phase, A can adaptively make queries including Oenc(IDTi),
Oreenc(sjTi), Ord(IDTi), Onextsp(s
j
Ti
), Ocp(Ti), and OT;v(v) C responds to A as
described in the privacy game.
Challenge: C chooses a random bit b from f0; 1g. If b = 0, C selects a tag
Tc which did not go through R. Otherwise, C selects a tag Tc which went
through R. Then, C reads out the current state of Tc, i.e., sjTc , and sends to
A an updated state sj+1Tc computed using ReEnc(s
j
Tc
).
Phase 2:In this phase, A can continue to make queries as those in Phase 1
adaptively with the restriction that A cannot make a query on OT;v(R).
Decision: The adversary A outputs his guess bit b0. If b0 = 1, means he guesses
Tc went through R. If b
0 = 0, means he guesses Tc did not got through R.
Analysis. The tag path authentication protocol is a typical ElGamal-based public
key encryption scheme [23], and randomly re-encrypted each time when a reader
interacts with the tag. ElGamal encryption scheme [23] itself is based on the
discrete logarithm problem. So, if the adversary can identify a tag and its path
which are encrypted by the above encryption scheme, it means that he can
decrypt the state of the tag. With the help of this adversary, we can construct
another adversary who can directly solve the discrete logarithm problem.
4.3 Unlinkability
Unlinkability includes tag unlinkability and path unlinkability. Tag unlinka-
bility means that given some states of two arbitrary tags T0 and T1 in a supply
chain, no PPT adversaryA can distinguish T0 from T1 with non-negligible advan-
tage. Path unlinkability means that given two tags T0 and T1 in a supply chain,
no PPT adversary A can tell if these two tags went through a same path with
non-negligible advantage. Intuitively, tag unlinkability implies path unlinkabili-
ty. Since, if there is a PPT adversary who can tell whether two tags go through
an identical path, we can construct another adversary, and with the help of the
previous adversary, the later can distinguish these two tags from some states
that were read out from some reader in the path. However, the reverse does not
hold. So, in this part, we only give a proof sketch of tag unlinkability.
Theorem 3. If there exists a PPT adversary A that can break the tag unlink-
ability of our protocol, then there must exist a PPT adversary B who can break
the IND  CPA security of ElGamal encryption scheme.
Proof. Recall the denition of IND  CPA security: we say a scheme is IND  CPA
secure if a PPT adversary A is given a ciphertext of randomly chosen two mes-
sagesm0 andm1 with identical length in the message space after he has accessed
to private-key extraction oracle several times with the restriction that A is not
allowed to make the private key query on the target entity. A cannot distinguish
whether the target ciphertext from the challenger is ofm0 orm1. It is well known
that ElGamal public key encryption scheme is IND  CPA secure, whose securi-
ty is based on the discrete logarithm problem. If the adversary can distinguish
two tags' states (which means that the adversary can distinguish two messages
of ElGamal-based's ciphertexts),it breaks the IND  CPA security of ElGamal
scheme. So, there is no such adversary who can break the tag path unlinkability
of our tag path authentication protocol.
5 Performance Comparison
Analysis in this part shows that our protocol is more ecient than the pre-
vious work both in the computational cost and memory space of tags.
Table 1 shows that our protocol only needs 4 multiplication and 6 expo-
nentiation operations in re-encryption, while Tracker [4] needs 3 multiplication
and 8 exponentiation operations in re-encryption. During the verication, we
need 2 multiplication and 2 exponentiation operations, while Tracker [8] needs
3 multiplication and 5 exponentiation operations. Meanwhile, Tracker [4] needs
4 HMAC signatures in the running of the protocol, we even do not need any sig-
nature. But we need `-jpathj addition operations, while Tracker does not need.
Here, jpathj is the length of the valid path. However, the addition operation is
Table 1. Comparison on Computational Costs
Tracker [4] Ours
Re-encryption Verication Re-encryption Verication
Multiplication 3 3 4 2
Exponentiation 8 5 6 2
Addition none none none `  jpathj
HMAC 2 2 none
negligible compared with multiplication and exponentiation operation. So, we
can draw the conclusion that our tag path authentication protocol is much more
ecient than [4] in computational cost. This enhances the system's eciency
which makes it more practical in real implementation.
Table 2. Comparison on Memory Size
Tracker [4] Our Protocol
Tag Memories 960 bits 800 bits
From Table 2, we observe that our protocol needs less tag memory than
Tracker [4] (i.e., 5 elliptic group elements (800 bits) vs. 6 elliptic group elements
(960 bits)). Since tags with less memory are less cheap and widely-accepted,
researchers tend to design secure tag path authentication protocol with less tag
memories in RFID-based supply chain management.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a more ecient path authentication protocol in an
RFID-based supply chain. Our solution is a signicant improvement over the
previous work [4] both in computational cost and memory requirement on tags.
Our protocol is compatible with EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags and is provably secure
under authentication, privacy, and (tag and path) unlinkability.
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